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I. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the 1960's and 70's, developing countries became 
increasingly wary of direct foreign investment. In large part, this 
change resulted from the view that the interests of foreign-con-
trolled multi-national corporations (MNCs) were often inconsistent 
with the priorities and goals of the host country.! Developing coun-
tries no longer perceived the presence of an MNC as a positive 
contribution to economic development. 2 Various groups began to 
demand that foreign investment be restricted. To maintain political 
legitimacy and stay afloat amid domestic unrest, host country gov-
ernments adopted a more critical attitude toward direct foreign 
investment. This attitude took the form of restrictions on the struc-
ture and operations of MNCs, divestitures, and expropriation.3 
Developing nations, reluctant to forego foreign capital alto-
gether, turned to debt. 4 Bank loans channeled through the public 
sector were used to establish or expand domestically controlled 
I MNCs are often unwilling to invest in key heavy industries or infrastructure where 
costs are high and rates of return low. See Frieden, Third World Indebted Industrialization: 
International Finance and State Capitalism in Mexico, Brazil, Algeria, and South Korea, 35 INT'L 
ORG. 407, 412 (1981). 
2 See generally, Oliver, The Andean Foreign Investment Code: A New Phase in the Quest for a 
Normative Order as to Direct Foreign Investment, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 763 (1972). 
3 Stm;\ies indicate that among other factors influencing the probabiiity that a nation will 
expropriate property is the increase in political unrest within a country. In part this was 
interpreted to be an effort to maintain power by maintaining legitimacy in the face of 
domestic protests against MNCs. Jodice, Sources of Change in Third World Regimes for Foreign 
Direct Investment, 1968-1976, 34 INT'L ORG. 177 (1980). 
4 Frieden, supra note 1, at 412. 
39 
40 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:39 
enterprises, both private and public.5 Commercial borrowing be-
came the politically acceptable alternative to direct foreign invest-
ment. In Latin America, foreign banks replaced MNCs and inter-
governmental aid as the most important source of financing. 6 In 
turn, heavy borrowings from foreign banks produced serious debt 
repayment problems for many developing countries. 7 These prob-
lems reached crisis proportions when, in 1982, Mexico declared it 
could no longer meet its current obligations.8 
In an effort to ease reliance on commercial borrowing, devel-
oping countries are once again looking to direct foreign investment 
as a source of needed capital. The attitude of foreign investors, 
however, has changed. With a history of host country hostility and 
instability over the past two decades, investors have grown more 
cautious. As a result, from 1981 to 1984 the net flow of foreign 
direct investment to developing countries declined by 26%.9 Today, 
potential foreign direct investors require assurances including clear 
investment guidelines, guarantees of economic obligations, and ac-
cess to an international body for dispute resolution. 
One scheme to promote foreign direct investment that is at-
tracting a great deal of attention from developing countries and 
investors alike is "debt-equity swaps." Converting debt to equity is 
similar to the process of reorganizing bankrupt corporations with a 
view to revitalizing them. lo In corporate reorganizations, creditors 
commonly convert part of the debt owed to them into capital stock 
of the corporation. II The result is lower debt and lower interest 
burdens. If the corporation survives and prospers, the investors 
may see some return. The Chrysler bailout scheme employed this 
technique, and lenders eventually benefited. 12 
Developing countries adopt a similar practice by structuring 
debt-equity swaps. Through debt-equity swaps, developing country 
debt is converted into foreign equity in a domestic firm. Citicorp's 
Chairman, John Reed, is optimistic about the future of swaps: "An 
equity investment is a better asset today in Brazil than a loan to the 
5Id. 
6Id. at 409. 
7 See generally, Lochhead, Debtors, Bankers in Woeful Chorus, INSIGHT, Aug. 31, 1987. 
8 See generally, Lochhead, A Debt Cure That Could Kill, INSIGHT, Aug. 31, 1987, at 17. 
9 Latin American countries which had traditionally attracted the bulk of direct invest-
ments were hit especially hard by this development. Voss, The Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency: Status, Mandate, Concept, Features, Implications, 21 J. OF WORLD TRADE L. 5, 8 (1987). 
10 Weinert, Swapping Third World Debt, 65 FOREIGN POL'y, 85, 89 (1986-87). 
II Id. 
12Id. 
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central bank, where the loan is 20 years, subject to renegotiation at 
the will of the borrower, at what would appear an ever declining 
rate."13 
Debt swaps have been chipping away at developing country 
debt, but these transactions can only substantially reduce debt over 
a long period. The few billion dollars' worth of swaps transacted in 
1986 is dwarfed by the several hundred billion dollars in total debt 
that still exists. 14 The fact remains that outstanding debt overwhelms 
investment possibilities. For example, foreign banks' outstanding 
loans to Brazil are $67 billion, while the total value of the companies 
traded on its stock market is only $41 billion. 15 Foreign investors 
will only be interested in certain investment opportunities and there 
are a limited amount of businesses that countries will want foreign-
ers to acquire. Similarly, most developing countries will want to 
restrict foreign investment to enterprises that will bring in foreign 
exchange earnings or foster import substitutes. 
Nevertheless, a beginning has been made. Debt swaps do ini-
tiate a restructuring of a nation's balance sheet away from debt. 
Moreover, they serve as a catalyst to improve a nation's investment 
climate. 16 This Note analyzes the obstacles that both host country 
and investor must overcome to take advantage of swap schemes. 
First, it will discuss what exactly a debt-equity swap is and the 
advantages and disadvantages that it presents to the host countries. 
Second, it will discuss the potential risks of private investment in 
the Latin American context and how these risks can be mitigated 
through a comprehensive foreign investment scheme such as Mex-
ico's. Finally, it will address the possibility of using an investment 
insurance program as a complement to swap transactions to attract 
additional direct foreign investment. 
II. SWAPS: WHAT THEY ARE, How THEY WORK, AND THEIR 
ATTRACTION 
A typical swap transaction works as follows: an MNC that wants 
to invest in a country will approach a broker who will purchase that 
country's debt at a discount from its face value in the secondary 
market. The MNC will buy the debt and present it to the host 
13 Lochhead, Western Money and Holes in the Third World's Pockets, INSIGHT, Aug. 31,1987, 
12, 14. 
14 Weinert, supra note 10, at 93. 
15 Lochhead, supra note 13, at 15. 
16 [d. 
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country's government, which will redeem the debt at close to face 
value in local currency. The company invests the local currency 
within the countryP As such, the swap serves as a vehicle for foreign 
direct investment. 18 The equity position is held by the original 
holder of the debt (a bank) or by a foreign MNC.19 
Developing countries generally structure two types of debt-
equity transactions. The first type allows foreign banks to convert 
some of their own debt into local investments. As a result of a recent 
debt conversion in Chile, Bankers Trust now owns 40% of Chile's 
largest pension fund and 96% of its largest life insurance company.20 
Bankers Trust also has a $25 million stake in a Brazilian autoparts 
maker following a similar transaction.21 
The second and more common type of transaction gives MNCs 
a local equity stake, using the secondary market that exists for 
developing country debt. Fiat, for example, used such a swap 
scheme to expand its plant in Brazil.22 It bought Brazilian debt at 
a steep discount in the secondary market and delivered the debt 
instrument to the Brazilian central bank. 23 The central bank retired 
the debt, registered the retired debt as if it were a new investment 
and gave Fiat the cruzado equivalent of the face value of the debt.24 
Debt-equity swaps depend on the willingness of developing 
countries to buy back their debt using local currency, provided that 
the proceeds are invested in the country.25 Three countries have 
had quite active programs allowing conversion of debt into equity: 
Chile, Mexico, and the Philippines.26 As of April, 1987, these three 
alone had authorized swaps of about $1.4 billion of their debt into 
foreign equity.27 MNC interest in these schemes stems from the fact 
that developing country debt has been available in the secondary 
market at a steep discount to face value. In May, 1987, an MNC 
could get 42% more Mexican pesos through a swap than by pur-
17 Schubert, Trading Debt for Equity, THE BANKER, Feb. 1 9S7, at 19. 
18 RICHARD A. DEBS, DAVID L. ROBERTS, ELI M. REMOLONA, FINANCE FOR DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF FINANCE - DEBT SWAPS IS (l9S7). 
19Id. 
20 Lochhead, supra note 13, 12, 14. 
21Id. 
22 Weinert, supra note 10, at 90. 
23Id. Steep discount means that the debt was bought at a significant reduction from the 
face value of the debt. This discount reflects the free market's assessment of the true value 
of the debt. 
24Id. 
25 Debs, supra note IS, at 22. 
260llard, The Debt Swappers, EUROMONEY, Aug. 19S6, 69, 71. 
27 Debs, supra note IS, at 22. 
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chasing pesos at the official exchange rate.28 Similarly, swapping 
Chilean debt could get the foreign investor as much as 32% more 
domestic currency than an ordinary foreign exchange transaction.29 
MNCs often enter into debt-equity swaps to meet local currency 
needs of their subsidiaries based in the debtor countries. Rather 
than adding to the subsidiaries' equity by transferring dollars that 
will be converted at the official rate, the MNC can enjoy substantial 
savings by using swaps. Through such swap transactions, for ex-
ample, Allied-Signal Inc. acquired local currency in Chile, and 
Chrysler added $100 million into Chrysler de Mexico with money 
obtained from buying Mexican debt at a steep discount.3D 
Sometimes a bank undertakes the investment directly, bypass-
ing the secondary market and thereby preserving book values for 
its assets. 31 Citicorp expects to reduce its loans to developing coun-
tries by about $5 billion over the next three years through debt-
equity swaps and loan sales.32 Such steps would follow in the wake 
of Citicorp's mid-May $3 billion increase in loan-loss reserves.33 
Citicorp has approximately 5,000 people stationed in Latin America 
looking for investment opportunities.34 Chairman Reed would like 
the bank to invest $200 million in 1987.35 
Economists have criticized debt swaps as interfering with tra-
ditional economic adjustment policies of developing countries by 
causing a loss of control over the money supply or the exchange 
rate.36 They do help, however, by converting a developing country's 
foreign debt into obligations with payments that the economy might 
be better able to handle.37 Moreover, they could encourage priva-
tization of firms that would otherwise be a burden on the economy.38 
2S Bartlett, The Citi Squeezes Its Lemons, Bus. WK., June 15, 1987, at 31. 
29Id. 
'0 Truell, Third World Creditors Give Debt-Equity Swaps a Try, WALL ST. j., June 11, 1987, 
at 6, col. 1; Riemer, A Way to Turn Debt From Burden to Boon, Bus. WK., Dec. 22, 1987,25. 
'I Book value is the amount of the debt reflected on a bank's financial statement. For 
example, $100 in debt would be stated as $100 in assets by the bank. If a bank sells an asset 
at a value below what it has stated on its financial statement, then the value of the remaining 
assets is thrown into question. 
'2 Truell, Citicorp Plans to Shed Big Part of Loans to Third World Through Swaps, Sales, WALL 
ST. j., May 22, 1987, at 3, col. 2. 
ss Loan-loss reserves are provisions banks make for doubtful loans. Citicorp was the first 
large bank to set aside from retained earnings a large amount to cover doubtful developing 
country debt. 
s. Truell, supra note 32. 
sSId. 
'6 French, Mexico's Capital Idea, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1986, 167, 172. 
S7 Debs, supra note 18, at 27. 
'SId. 
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The main advantage of debt swaps is that they replace a debt 
liability that requires immediate service with an equity liability that 
presumably will better fit the country's ability to pay.39 The host 
country's balance of payments may benefit from postponed pay-
ments in hard currency.40 A successful program would have to 
impose some restrictions on capital repatriation in the first years.41 
Otherwise there would be no advantage to the host country; instead 
of paying interest to creditors they would be paying dividends to 
investors. Thus, the swaps that have been made to date have op-
erated within the constraints of the restructuring agreements.42 
Earnings can not be brought back to the home country sooner than 
the rescheduled debt repayments.43 Eventually, however, investors 
expect to remit earnings and assurances would have to be made.44 
It is not clear whether a growing market for developing country 
debt swaps will help or hinder the rescheduling process. The key 
factor is to what degree the swaps will attract foreign equity invest-
ment that would not otherwise come in.45 Without the additional 
investment, the benefit of substituting foreign equity for external 
debt is slight.46 The country could achieve the same ends by ear-
marking the foreign exchange that was coming in through previ-
ously planned investment to retire debtY 
Proponents of swaps, including many large money center banks 
and investment companies, argue that swaps give debtor countries 
access to badly needed investments in export oriented industries.48 
But opponents say that the money would have come in anyway.49 
They note that companies that already have facilities in debtor 
countries are the major users of swaps, employing them as a cheap 
way to expand operations. 50 
Under either view, the advantages of swaps are reduced to the 
degree of additional investment or "additionality" that is brought 
391d. at 32. 
4°Id. 
41 ld. at 33. 
42 Buchheit, Converting Sovereign Debt into Equity Investments, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Sept. 
1986, 10, 12. 
43 Schubert, supra note 17, at 19. 
44 Debs, supra note 18, at 33. 
451d. at 28. 
461d. 
47 !d. 
48 Marton, The Debate Over Debt for Equity Swaps, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Feb. 1987, 
177. 
491d. 
50Id. 
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into the host country.51 If an MNC had already decided to invest 
before a country had introduced a swap program there would be 
no additionality. By contrast, there would be additionality if an 
MNC with no intention to invest responds to a new swap scheme 
by investing. 52 
Direct swaps into equity by banks seem to hold the most poten-
tial for bringing about additionality. Since most banks did not intend 
to invest directly when they first made the loans to the developing 
countries, these swaps give them equity positions they would not 
otherwise hold.53 
Investment over the long term, however, depends primarily on 
the expected profitability of business opportunities, which in turn 
depends on the political and economic climate of the host country. 
The opportunity of an investor to take advantage of the discounts 
in the secondary market will certainly induce some additionality, 
but even more can be induced if the country moves toward liberal 
investment policies. 54 
III. MAJOR DRAWBACKS OF SWAPS 
Foreign investors gain from debt swaps because of discounts in 
the secondary market. By redeeming the discounted debt at face 
value, the host country is in effect giving a subsidized exchange 
rate. 55 "In nine out of ten swaps, it is one big rip-off," charges 
Rudiger Dornbusch, economics professor at MIT.56 "The invest-
ment would have come in anyway, and with a swap the central bank 
is saddled with paying an unnecessary subsidy to provide the local 
currency."57 Bankers do not dismiss the charge but add that an 
additional $20-30 million is usually tacked on to the investment.58 
A preferential rate for certain capital inflows ultimately penalizes 
exports, import substitutes, and other sectors that earn or save 
foreign exchange. 59 Resources that could be invested in those trade 
51 This term expresses the concept of new investment coming in above and beyond that 
which was already going to come in and was in response to the swap program. 
5. Debs, supra note 18, at 28. 
5'ld. at 30. 
5'ld. at 31. 
55ld. at 34. 
56 Marton, supra note 48, at 177. 
57 ld. 
5Bld. 
59 Debs, supra note 18, at 34. 
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sectors go elsewhere. Just because investment is coming in does not 
mean it is good for the country.60 
Swaps may misallocate resources by earmarking the foreign 
exchange proceeds of capital inflows for debt retirement.61 In some 
situations, there may be better uses for the foreign exchange, for 
example, to pay for needed imports.62 If a country is looking for 
new money from its creditors in the form of debt it appears incon-
sistent to be repaying debt through the swap market.63 
Opponents of swaps add that swaps allow foreigners to ex-
change non-performing debt for control of viable domestic assets 
at a discount.64 The Mexican press reacted negatively when foreign 
creditors gained 45% of the equity in the country's largest conglom-
erate, Crupo Industrial Alfa, in exchange for $920 million in debt.65 
The issue of foreign control over assets is not as contentious as 
that of inflation.66 Critics point out that local currency created by 
central banks to purchase the swapped debt only adds to inflationary 
pressures feared by so many developing countries.67 Mexico recently 
suspended its debt-equity swap program, citing concern about the 
country's accelerating inflation rate.68 
Another factor that causes concern is that local firms and in-
dividuals earning foreign exchange will not want to surrender their 
foreign currency at official exchange rates when they can use swaps 
and increase their returns.69 Local importers will take advantage of 
the swaps' discounts by over-invoicing, thereby acquiring more for-
eign exchange from the central bank than they need to meet their 
trade bills.70 With the excess foreign exchange, they can buy dis-
60 Id. 
61Id. 
6. Id. 
63Id. 
64 Banks term debt as non-performing when interest payments become past due. 
65 Marton, supra note 48, at 177. 
66 Orme, Swaps Spur Foreign Investment in Mexico, Fin. Times (London), Jan. 5, 1987, at 
18, col. 4. 
67 Fear of inflation is one of the reasons Ecuador has been hesitant to get into the swap 
market. Whitelaw, Ecuador Stall on Equity Swaps, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1987, at 135. "It's [swaps] 
business for everybody, but it's bad business for the country," charges former Argentine 
economics minister Roberto Alemann. He also adds there is the question of public spending 
priorities; the funds could be better spent on other things besides retiring debt-like roads, 
pensions, and healthcare. Marton, supra note 48, at 177. 
68 Truell, Brazil Sets Up a Plan to Swap Debt for Equity, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1987, at 29, 
col. 1. 
69 Debs, supra note 18, at 35. 
7°Id. Over-invoicing is a scheme used by many importers when access to foreign exchange 
is restricted. In order for importers to obtain foreign exchange to pay for their goods they 
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counted debt in the secondary market and swap it for local cur-
rency.71 This "round-tripping" uses up official exchange reserves.72 
The government loses reserves with the capital flight but gains no 
reserves on the return trip, since returning capital is used to retire 
debt. 73 Fordgn firms that would not otherwise remit their earnings 
may be tempted to do so. They can convert their profits into foreign 
exchange at the central bank and then take advantage of the pref-
erential rates by bringing it back through swaps.74 
To protect against the depletion of reserves from the danger 
of round-tripping, the government must tighten exchange and cap-
ital controls.75 Unfortunately, these very controls can weaken the 
attractiveness of the country to additional investment.76 
Some critics attack the entire notion of direct foreign invest-
ment as a long term answer to growth in the developing countries, 
and thus the idea of swaps too. As a development strategy, direct 
investment overlooks the fact that Japan and other postwar success 
stories pursued opposite strategies. They drastically limited foreign 
participation in their economies, promoted domestic savings and 
import substitution, and only gradually liberalized once their do-
mestic entrepreneurs were strong enough to compete.77 
Despite the disadvantages of swap programs, Latin American 
countries are going forward with them and investors are looking 
for new opportunities.78 The key to their success is to attract new 
investment or additionality. This is often difficult since investors 
fear asset expropriation. 
IV. DIFFICULTIES IN ATTRACTING NEW INVESTORS: THE SPECTER 
OF EXPROPRIATION 
Investment disputes have been significant, especially in con-
nection with Latin America. From the conflict with Mexico over 
present an invoice to the central bank who in turn gives them the required foreign exchange 
to make the purchase. Over-invoicing inflates the importers' foreign exchange needs beyond 
the cost of the goods purchased. 
71 [d. 
72 The term derives from the way the foreign exchange goes out of the country purely 
to come back again in the form of a swap. 
73/d. 
74 [d. 
75 [d. 
76 [d. at 36. 
77 Kuttner, Third World Debt: A Flawed Solution, Bus. WK., Jan. 19, 1987, at 18. 
78 See, e.g., Truell, supra note 68, at 29. 
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U.S.-national ownership of petroleum rights in the 1920's and 30's, 
to the nationalizations of the Kennecott and Anaconda copper 
mines in Chile by Allende in 1970-71, U.S. relations with Latin 
America have been fraught with conflict over the private property 
rights of U.S. investors.79 One count by the U.S. Department of 
State found 87 purported instances of expropriating acts during a 
two year period in the early 1970's.80 Nevertheless, no system has 
yet to emerge by which those conflicts are remitted to juridical 
determination.81 
Capital-exporting countries have argued that investment con-
flicts such as alleged expropriation should be removed to interna-
tional adjudication.82 The developing world, however, has been slow 
to embrace the proposal that disputes between two nations be re-
solved by an international authority.83 Latin America's response to 
proposals for international dispute resolution has not been warm 
and is deeply rooted in the Calvo doctrine.84 The Calvo doctrine 
has two main themes: (1) strict nonintervention by foreign powers 
in what is held to be the responsibility of the host country to adju-
dicate rights concerning resources within their borders and com-
pensation for expropriation; and (2) absolute subjection of foreign-
ers to the laws and juridical regimes of the host countries.85 The 
Calvo doctrine has been embraced throughout Latin America.86 
Latin America's attempts to legislate the Calvo doctrine globally 
met with success in the United Nations' endorsement of the Charter 
of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS).87 Article 2 of the 
Charter substantially restated Calvo. Paragraph One of the Article 
79 Rogers, Of Missionaries, Fanatics, and Lawyers: Some Thoughts on Investment Disputes in the 
Americas, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 1-2 (1978). 
80 Ganz, The Marcona Settlement: New Forms of Negotiation and Compensation for Nationalized 
Property, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 474 n.2 (1977). 
81 Rogers, supra note, 79 at 2. 
82Id. 
83Id. 
84 For a general discussion of the Calvo Doctrine see Szasz, The Investment Disputes Con-
vention and Latin America, 11 VA. J. INT'L L., 256, 260-62 (1971). 
85 Rogers, supra note 79, at 3. 
86 Szasz, supra note 84, at 261 n. 24. Calvo clauses appear in a variety of Latin American 
constitutions and conventions. See, e.g., VENEZ. CON ST. art. XXI para. 1 (1947): Aliens in 
Venezuela have, without prejudice to what is provided in international conventions, the 
duties and rights that this Constitution and the laws grant to them; but neither the one nor 
the other may be greater than those of Venezuelans. The foreigner, in essence, is bound by 
local rule, even if that rule is a violation of international law. 
87 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. Al9631 (1974). 
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provided that each state shall freely exercise full sovereignty over 
all its wealth, natural resources, and economic activities.88 Even 
more Calvo-like are paragraphs 2(2)(a) and 2(2)(c). Paragraph 
2(2)(a) stated: "[Each state has the right to] regulate and exercise 
authority over foreign investment within its national jurisdiction in 
accordance with its laws and regulations and in conformity with its 
national objectives and priorities. No state shall be compelled to 
grant preferential treatment to foreign investment. "89 
Paragraph 2(2)(c) recognizes the right of states to "nationalize, 
expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property."90 Compen-
sation for property taken is to be determined under the standard 
of the nationalizing state.91 Furthermore, any controversy over com-
pensation is to be settled in the courts of the nationalizing state 
under the state's domestic laws.92 
The main problem with the Charter was that it ignored inter-
national law's role in resolving disputes.93 Nothing in the Charter 
would constrain a state from adopting an arbitrary standard for 
compensation, or discourage biased administration of compensation 
laws by local courts.94 But these reservations failed to persuade the 
developing nations which overwhelmingly supported the Charter.95 
CERDS is in stark contrast to the traditional rule of interna-
tional law which recognizes the rights of sovereign nations to ex-
propriate property for a public purpose only upon prompt, ade-
quate, and effective compensation.96 The traditional rule was 
restated in 1962 in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
1803.97 Doubts about the general acceptance of the traditional rule, 
88Id. at 52. 
89Id. 
90Id. 
91Id. 
92/d. 
93 Rogers, supra note 79, at 6. 
94 /d. 
95 Id., The vote was 124 to 6 with 10 abstentions. The "no" votes were all cast by capital 
exporters - U.S., Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, and the U.K. 
96 Restatement (second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1965). For a 
good analysis of CERDS in the context of the general assault on foreign protection, see 
Lillich, The Diplomatic Protection of Nationals Abroad; an Elementary Principle of International Law 
Under Attack, 69 AM. J. INT'L L 359 (1975). 
97 G.A. Res. 1803 (xvii), 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.17) at 15, U.N. Doc. Al5217 (1962). 
The Resolution states in part: In such cases [expropriation] the owner shall be paid an 
appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the state taking such 
measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law. . .. 
settlement of the dispute should be made through arbitration or international adjudication. 
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however, arose soon thereafter when, in 1963 the V.S. Supreme 
Court stated "[t]here are few if any issues in international law today 
on which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a 
state's power to expropriate property of aliens."98 This division of 
opinion stems in part from the fact that many developing countries 
believe that the traditional rules of international law were not for-
mulated with their consent and therefore they are not bound by 
them.99 According to the traditional view, a state may not impose 
the same standards on aliens that it imposes on nationals if such 
treatment would fall below the internationally accepted minimum 
standard. 100 
This view is not shared by those countries that subscribe to the 
Calvo doctrine. lOl National control of the economy is considered a 
sovereign right. Requiring adherence to a minimum standard of 
protection for aliens infringes on the state's regulation of its own 
economy. 102 
The Charter's rejection of both the obligation to compensate 
and the rules providing a minimum standard of protection for 
aliens is a resounding rejection of the traditional rule. Though The 
Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (the 
"Restatement") substantially restates the traditional principles of 
international law on expropriation,103 the Comments point out that 
the "prompt, adequate, and effective" standard is a V.S. position.104 
The Reporters declare that the principles of full compensation were 
settled law "[e]arly in this century" implying they are not settled law 
today.105 The Reporters favor the traditional rule but admit the 
evidence is not conclusive. 
There have been numerous settlements by aliens or their gov-
ernments with expropriating states, but these do not provide 
persuasive evidence as to what the parties to the settlement 
98 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 u.s. 398,428-29 (1964). This case dealt 
with Cuban expropriation of an American commodity broker's assets in Cuba. The Court 
reversed the lower court decision and held that the act of state doctrine proscribes a challenge 
to the validity of the Cuban expropriation. 
99 I d. at 430. 
100 B. WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 117 (1959). 
101 Among the countries that subscribe to the Calvo doctrine are Brazil, Argentina, and 
Mexico. 
102 Wortley, supra note 100, at 126-28. 
103 Rest. 3rd, Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States Sec. 712, 
713 hereinafter, Restatement. 
104 Restatement Sec. 712 comment c. 
105 Restatement Sec. 712, Reporters' note 1. 
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believed the relevant law to be. Such settlements are often made 
for political or larger economic reasons, and it is uncertain 
whether the expropriating state is paying with a sense of inter-
national legal obligation to compensate .... 106 
51 
There are thus two conflicting views of international law concerning 
a state's responsibility for injury to aliens. The question of which 
rule prevails is unresolved. 
The Charter received the assent of the developing nations but 
not that of the developed countries. Because so many developing 
countries have rejected the traditional rule, it arguably is no longer 
a settled principle of international law. This disagreement among 
states has resulted in a situation where there is "no international 
law regarding compensation for expropriation."107 
V. MEXICO: A MODEL FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
In this atmosphere of uncertainty as to foreign investors' rights 
and remedies, the host country governments and investors must 
work together to facilitate debt-equity swaps. An established pro-
gram is needed which will address the desire for direct investment 
to offset the debt and at the same time recognize the need to 
maintain control over economic development. If the investment is 
perceived as too great, the host country may be forced to expro-
priate for nationalistic and political reasons. The best approach is 
to establish a legal and regulatory framework that will promote 
foreign direct investment through swaps without threatening the 
integrity of the host country. The Mexican National Development 
Plan (NDP), presented by President de la Madrid on May 31, 1983, 
is such an approach. lOS 
The NDP is a 430 page document containing the political and 
economic policies that govern the Mexican state in very detailed 
form. 109 With the support of NDP guidelines, the Executive Secre-
106Id. 
107 Note, Creating a Framework for the Re-Introduction of International Law to Controversies 
Over Compensation for Expropriation of Foreign Investments, 9 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM., 163, 174 
(1982). 
108 Trevino, Mexico: The Present Status of Legislation and Government Policies on Direct Foreign 
Investments, 18 INT'L LAW. 297, 301 (1984). 
109 The investment provisions of the NDP may be summarized as follows: 
(A) Foreign investment will be treated as complementary to Mexican investment. 
(B) Foreign capital will not be permitted to acquire efficient, already established companies 
or dominate priority branches of industry. 
(C) Foreign investment acquisitions or majority participation in already established Mexican 
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tary of the National Commission on Foreign Investment (NCFI) 
has made various policy statements to the effect that foreign in-
vestments may be a factor in solving Mexico's economic crisis. 110 
Nevertheless, Mexico is not willing to receive foreign investment in 
an indiscriminate manner. III 
The Law on Foreign Investment (LFI) controls the extent to 
which foreign investors may participate in certain Mexican invest-
ment opportunities. ll2 For example, 34% of special mining conces-
sions, 49% of ordinary mining concessions, and 40% of secondary 
petrochemical operations and autoparts manufacturing, are the 
maximum percentages of foreign investment allowed in those re-
spective areas.ll3 For other economic areas, 49% is the general rule, 
though the NCFI has the power to approve applications for majority 
ownership on a case-by-case basis if it deems the investment to be 
in the interest of the Mexican economy.ll4 
In accordance with the LFI, the NCFI determines whether the 
foreign investment is acceptable for the country, and the require-
ments that must be fulfilled. ll5 To meet these requirements the 
investment should be complementary to Mexican investment, ori-
ented to the priority sectors, able to generate new sources of em-
ployment, able to make an adequate technological contribution, and 
an effective form of import substitution. ll6 
Debt-equity swaps are approved on a case-by-case basis by the 
Mexican Finance Ministry (Hacienda) in conjunction with the 
companies may be authorized in exceptional cases where there is a significant contribution 
in technology, trade balance, or increased Mexican content in product manufacturing. 
(D) The following criteria will be adopted and sought in selectively promoting and screening 
foreign investments: 
1. effective substitution of imports; 
2. a good or even better balance of payments; 
3. international competitiveness of goods prod~ced; and 
4. actual transfer of modern technology and managerial abilities. 
(E) The administrative process for authorization of investment will be streamlined. 
(F) A more flexible treatment of small and medium sized foreign investors will be established 
to allow their capital contributions to flow more easily to the agricultural and consumer goods 
sectors. Trevino, supra note 98, at 300. 
110 Id. at 301. 
III Id. 
ll2Id. Its complete title is the "Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign 
Investment" of Feb. 16, 1973, in force since May 8, 1973. 
'" Id. 
ll4 French, supra note 36, at 168; Maviglia, Mexico's Guidelines for Foreign Investment: The 
Selective Promotion of Necessary Industries, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 281,292 (1986). 
ll5 Trevino, supra note 108, at 301. 
ll6Id. 
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NCFI.ll7 The Mexican government usually redeems debts at less 
than face value. ll8 The size of the discount depends on the type of 
investment applied for and can vary from 0% for participation in 
state enterprises, and 25% for projects that do not generate foreign 
exchange and are not a priority.1l9 
Having an investment scheme that protects the country from 
too much foreign investment is a step in the right direction. If the 
restrictions are tight enough, foreign investment that does come in 
will probably not be a threat or act as a catalyst in ousting the sitting 
government. 
An example of a foreign investment scheme that has met with 
great success is the Maquiladora program. 120 Typically, a Maquila-
dora exports raw materials and equipment to a Mexican assembly 
operation, which assembles or processes these materials and then 
reimports the finished product to the U.S. for sale. 121 Mexico ben-
efits from the maquiladora industry in a number of ways. The 
industry provides training and employment in economically de-
pressed border areas. Export earnings are increased and technology 
transfer is accomplished. 122 In July, 1986, 896 plants were operat-
ing, employing an estimated 255,000 Mexicans.123 
An investment scheme that protects the host from an over-
abundance of foreign investment is but one factor in the success of 
a swap program. The concept of additionality is the other key. If 
no additional investment comes into a country through a swap 
program, then the program is a failure. Private investors invest to 
make profits and not for reasons of benevolence. Thus, if they 
make profits they expect to keep them; if they acquire property 
they expect to keep it. A major deterrent to the flow of investment, 
especially in Latin America, has been the threat of expropriation. 
The investor must receive assurance that his investment is safe; an 
investment scheme alone is usually not enough. 
A foreign investment program such as Mexico's assures the 
Mexican people that foreign investment will proceed in concert with 
117 Buchheit, supra note 42, at 13. 
liS Ollard, supra note 26, at 69. 
119 This method helps the government steer the investment in the direction it wants. 
120 Tarbox, An Investor's Introduction to Mexico's Maquiladora Program, 22 TEX. INT'L L. J. 
109, 110 (1986). Generally this term refers to an offshore assembly operation involved in 
export-manufacturing processing, for example auto-parts. 
121Id. 
122Id. 
123Id. 
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the development goals of the country. However, investment guide-
lines such as Mexico's may not persuade foreign investors to come 
forward without additional guarantees. The specter of expropria-
tion still deters potential investors. The presence of a final ingre-
dient, a multilateral guarantee agency, is important to debt-equity 
swap planning. 
VI. TOWARD ATTRACTING ADDITIONALITY: THE ROLE OF MIGA 
One plan that will protect foreign investors will probably begin 
early next year under the auspices of the World Bank. 124 Called the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), it will become 
effective as soon as five more developed countries ratify its conven-
tion. 125 
MIGA is an international and broader variant of systems that 
exist in most developed countries for providing political risk insur-
ance. It goes further than many national plans that deny coverage 
to host countries that have to reschedule their debt, or the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) which often fails to match 
investor needs. 126 Investment guarantees extended by home coun-
tries or agencies to their nationals reinforce the traditional percep-
tion that investment protection serves only the interest of the home 
country. As an international institution, MIGA can plausibly be 
concerned with the interests of both home and host countries. 
MIGA's role is to minimize perceived non-commercial risk as a 
barrier to the flow of capital to developing countries. 127 The ultimate 
objective is to facilitate consideration of investments in developing 
countries on the same footing as investments in developed coun-
tries. 128 For example, MIGA will not just insure against expropria-
tion, but also against "creeping expropriation."129 MIGA defines 
creeping expropriation as a series of host country measures that in 
aggregate are expropriatory, like a combination of new taxes, and 
state-led wage increases that would make a project unprofitable. 130 
124 Voss, supra note 9, at 6. 
125 Lewis, New Plan Aims to Lessen Political Risk in Lending, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Sept. 
28, 1987, at 8, col. 5. 
126 Voss, supra note 9, at 13 n.33. 
127Id. at 8. 
128Id. 
129 Lewis, supra note 125, at 8. 
1300PIC, for one, does not insure against "creeping expropriation." Shanks, Insuring 
Investments and Loans Against Currency Inconvertability, Expropriation, and Political Violence, 9 
HASTINGS INT'L & COM. L. REv. 417,425 (1986). 
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MICA's coverage will be limited to new investments. 131 This limi-
tation preserves MICA's underwriting capacity for investments that 
might not proceed without guarantee protection. 132 Thus, MICA is 
specifically geared to produce additionality in direct foreign invest-
ment. 
MICA should be especially attractive to those Latin American 
countries, such as Calvo supporters, that regard international ar-
bitration as an impermissible external interference in their internal 
affairs. In the event of a dispute MICA could invoke the rights of 
the investors against the host country by subrogation, and has in-
dicated openness to alternative dispute settlement procedures. 133 
Unfortunately, as of June, 1987, Chile and Columbia are the only 
large Latin American countries to have signed the MICA conven-
tion. 134 
MICA alone is not the answer to attracting the additional in-
vestment needed to make a swap program successful. However, 
with the use of MICA in conjunction with a comprehensive foreign 
investment policy such as Mexico's, host countries could begin en-
couraging debt-equity swaps in larger numbers. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Debt-equity swaps are no panacea to the international debt 
crisis. They have many drawbacks and their modest size will never 
have a large impact on the overall debt picture. However, swaps are 
a market mechanism that is here to stay. Banks perceive them as a 
valid way to reduce some of their value impaired assets. Developing 
countries see them as an avenue for bringing in direct investment 
which will contribute to additional foreign exchange earnings. 
Investors and host countries must work together to make the 
most of the swaps' limited use. The host country must recognize 
that additionality is an important factor for any swap program to 
make sense. It must balance this desire against the equally strong 
desire to remain independent from foreign economic control. An 
investment program similar to Mexico's will allay opposition group 
fears and will reduce the likelihood of expropriation of foreign 
owned property. 
131 Voss, supra note 9, at 11. 
132 [d. at 11. 
13' [d. at 16. 
134 [d. at 6 nA. 
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Investors will perceive strong investment policies as a positive 
factor but will require further assurances to commit amounts that 
make swaps worthwhile for host countries. MIGA can play an im-
portant role in allaying investors' fears by providing insurance 
against expropriation. Therefore, it is in the developing countries' 
best interest to become a member of MIGA. Their traditional dislike 
for multilateral agencies that require international arbitration is not 
necessarily part of MIGA which is open to alternative forms of 
dispute resolution. There is no rational reason to reject its conven-
tion. 
Lawrence C. Berney 
